payment is essentially based on the average cost of care for a given DRG, adjusted to take account of geographic differences in wages and differences in certain hospital characteristics (such as whether it is a teaching hospital or serves a disproportionate share of the poor). Since the payment does not vary with length of stay, hospitals tend to gain financially when patients are discharged earlier than the average for their DRG; conversely hospitals tend to lose when patients are discharged later than the average for their DRG.
A major way hospitals can reduce length of stay is by discharging patients to be cared for in nursing homes when they no longer need acute care, but still have care needs that are too great to be met by informal care at home. W hen there is no nursing home bed available, however, the hospital may have no choice but to keep the patient for additional days. Prior to PPS, hospitals were reimbursed for these days. Under PPS this is no longer the case. PPS does allow for additional payments for extremely costly patients (called outliers), either because they stay an exceptionally long time or because they require exceptionally intensive care during their stay. But a patient's stay or cost has to be almost two standard deviations away from the mean of either the length of stay or cost distribution for the relevant DRG before the outlier payment applies.
If nursing home markets were essentially the same in all areas of the country, all hospitals would be in a similar situation with respect to ANDs. The nursing home bed supply in different areas varies considerably, however. In 1985, for example, the number of nursing home beds certified to care for Medicaid or Medicare patients per 1,000 of the elderly population ranged from a high of 91 in Minnesota to a low of under 23 in Florida (Kenney and Holahan 1988) . The percentage of beds certified for Medicare also varied widely, from a high of 88 percent in Nevada to a low of under 1 percent in Oklahoma; sim ilarly, variations exist in the percentage of beds certified to provide skilled nursing care.
The obvious disparities in nursing home bed availability indicate that hospitals do, indeed, face different nursing home markets in different areas of the country. If these differences are systematically associated with hospital differences in ANDs, there is at least pre sumptive evidence that there may be an AND equity issue. Table 1 records the existence of a strong relation between discharge delays and nursing home placement. It shows state-specific data on three measures of discharge delay, and the percentage of discharges to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and intermediate care facilities (ICFs) for 16 DRGs that commonly lead to postacute care. There is substantial variation across states. There also appears to be a systematic inverse relation between percentage of discharges to SNFs and ICFs, on the one hand, and discharge delays, on the other. Simple com parisons of the experience of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Iowa (in italic) with that of New York, Massachusetts, Virginia and the District of Columbia (in bold) highlight the pattern. The states in italics have particularly high proportions of patients discharged to SNFs or ICFs, combined with lower than average dis charge delays on all three measures; the opposite is true for the states in bold.
The studies summarized in this report confirm that there is indeed a problem of hospital discharge delays under PPS. Nursing home bed shortages in some areas are one reason. Others include low proportions of area beds certified to provide SNF care and the stringency of Medicaid nursing home reimbursement in some states. The effect of nursing home market access on discharge delays is not large on average, but it can constitute a substantial burden for some hospitals.
Addressing the issue is potentially difficult, with several dimensions of complexity. First, it should be remembered that PPS rates are based on all hospital charges (which include ANDs). In a sense, therefore, the system is already paying for ANDs. Because the current PPS system does not account for nursing home market access, however, those hospitals with easy access can discharge patients more quickly and are thus ''winners"; those w ith more lim ited access and thus more ANDs are "losers." Thus, any solution should arguably be budget neutral but would involve taking from the gainers and compensating the losers. W hether such a redistribution is appropriate depends on the extent of the problem. If these co sts are sufficiently large, some response would be warranted because of the effect on the financial status of adversely affected hospitals. U ltim ately, the quality of patient care offered Medicare beneficiaries in these hospitals could be threatened.
Second, even if there is an AND equity problem, it is not obvious that a separate AND payment is the solution. A major intent of PPS was to break the link between a hospital's own current costs, which it can control at least to a degree, and its reimbursement. Separate 
payments for ANDs would partially reestablish that link. An alter native m ight be to include an adjustment for nursing home bed supply in the PPS payment formula. But this may not be the solution, because of the other determinants of ANDs in addition to nursing home bed supply. Any adjustment should include all major deter minants, possibly increasing the complexity of the formula to a degree that would make it adm inistratively unworkable. Another approach would be to address directly the problem of access to the nursing home market through changes in the way such care is paid for. But this could be very costly. As the article demonstrates, the problem is complex and there are no easy solutions. Finally, two important changes in Medicare policy toward skilled nursing benefits have taken place since the period analyzed in this study. The first change occurred in April of 1988 when Medicare considerably relaxed its coverage requirements for skilled nursing home care. This in itself has reportedly increased the number of Medicarecovered admissions to nursing homes. The second change is contained in several provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 which substantially reduced coinsurance payments, eliminated the prior three-day hospital-stay requirement, and extended Medicare coverage from 100 to 150 days. These changes should increase the demand for care and may produce a Medicare nursing home population which is quite different in terms of care needs from those previously covered by Medicare. It is not clear, however, that these changes will increase nursing homes' willingness to admit and appropriately care for Medicare patients. The problems we point out in this article are directly relevant to considering how nursing homes m ight respond to these Medicare policy changes. That is, the evidence that access to nursing homes depends on the supply of beds and reimbursement policy suggests that there are serious limitations on the willingness of nursing homes to serve Medicare patients; these may well remain even following the relaxation of coverage requirements and the passage of the Catastrophic Coverage Act.
Study Approach and Data
The initial difficulty in studying the problem of ANDs is lack of directly relevant data, since the current reimbursement system pro- 
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vides no incentive for any hospitals to report them. Such data could be collected through a special survey of hospitals to collect information from medical records. The time and expense involved in this approach, however, effectively ruled it out for this study. Instead, we relied on a series of component studies, using several different measures of discharge delays as proxies for ANDs from a variety of data sources. Because access to the nursing home market is at the heart of any AND problem, two additional studies address nursing home partic ipation in Medicare. Table 2 provides an overview of the studies that were conducted. The first component study (Holahan and Dubay 1988) analyzes data obtained by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO conducted a survey in 1985 of a representative sample of the nation's hospitals; 985 hospitals responded. The hospitals were asked about their difficulty in placing patients and whether this difficulty had increased since the introduction of PPS. The GAO provided us with the survey response data, which we merged with information about the survey hospitals-including nursing home bed supply, charac teristics of the nursing home market, Medicaid nursing home reim bursement policies in the area, Medicare nursing home reimbursement policies, and annual hospital survey data on the characteristics of each hospital (such as teaching status, ownership, and occupancy rates). The key question addressed using this data base is whether discharge delays as measured by the survey responses are systematically related to nursing home capacity or reimbursement policy.
The second study (Kenney and Holahan 1988) uses data from the Medicaid provider analysis review (MEDPAR) data files of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). MEDPAR records data on 100 percent of all Medicare discharges contain patient-specific infor mation on diagnosis (DRG), length of stay, and basic demographic characteristics. The three measures of discharge delay used in this study are average length of stay, percentage of stays greater than the national geometric mean but less than the outlier threshold, and percentage of stays exceeding the outlier threshold. To improve the accuracy of these measures as proxies for ANDs, we focus on 16 DRGs most likely to be followed by formal postacute care. The key question addressed in this study is whether discharge delays are related to the supply of nursing home beds and to policies that affect the incentives of nursing homes to admit Medicare hospital beneficiaries.
The third study (Holahan 1988 ) uses data from the Center for Professional Hospital Activities (CPHA) professional activity study, which allow us to compare Medicare hospital beneficiaries according to their secondary insurance coverage-specifically, Medicare/ Medicaid beneficiaries, versus Medicare patients with secondary in surance, versus Medicare patients with no secondary insurance. The key question addressed in this study is whether some groups of Med icare patients are affected more adversely than others in tight nursing home markets or in markets where Medicaid and Medicare policies discourage the admission of heavier care patients.
The fourth study (W elch and Dubay 1988) uses the Medicare-cost report data from the second year of PPS, merged with the nursing home bed supply and reimbursement policy variables mentioned above, to examine the factors (including discharge delays) that affect hospital costs per admission. The model used in this study is the same model that has been used in determining the HCFA teaching and disproportionate share adjustments in the current PPS formula. Explanatory variables include a Medicare case-mix index, teaching status, measures of metropolitan area size, the HCFA wage index, and disproportionate share of poor patients. The key question ad dressed-the ultim ate question in a sense-is whether limited access to the nursing home market results in high cost per admission for the hospitals affected.
Each of these studies tests a common set of hypotheses in a m ultiple regression framework. The major explanatory variables are shown in table 3. The first variable is nursing home bed supply. The expectation is that discharge delays w ill be lower the higher the available bed supply. The second pair of variables-the percentage of beds certified to provide SNF care and the percentage certified for Medicare-are measures of the structure of the nursing home industry within each nursing home market. The expectation is that the higher the per centage of nursing home beds certified to provide SNF care or to provide care to Medicare patients, the more the nursing home market w ill be oriented toward sicker patients, the greater the access for Medicare patients, and the fewer the AND days.
The third variable is a measure of the stringency of Medicaid reimbursement policies. Information based on a 1980-1985 survey of Medicaid nursing home policies in the 50 states was used to classify the Medicaid reimbursement systems into four types (Laudicina 1987 ). The first is flat-rate arrangements under which the nursing homes are paid on the basis of a flat rate or set of class rates, with the rates being independent of any one facility's costs. The second system is facility-specific prospective payment with strong and weak efficiency incentives. Strong systems are defined as those where the rates, which are based on a nursing home's cost experience, are rebased no more frequently than every two years. The third system is prospective payments with weak incentives, that is, those that rebase yearly and have less stringent cost ceilings, etc. The distinction is based on the fact that the more frequent the rebasing, the more the reimbursement system approaches a cost-based system. The fourth system is costbased or retrospective payment systems, the least stringent cost-con tainment system of all.
The expectation is that nursing homes w ill respond to Medicaid programs w ith strong cost-containment incentives by reducing case mix and adjusting staffing commensurately. This response, in turn, w ill make nursing homes less well equipped to care for heavy-care Medicare hospital beneficiaries. Therefore, we expect that discharge The fourth variable is a measure of Medicare nursing home reim bursement policies, which are themselves likely to be important de terminants of nursing homes' decisions to admit Medicare patients from hospitals. Medicare pays on the basis of average costs up to a ceiling. If nursing home costs are low relative to Medicare ceilings, it may be possible for nursing homes to admit hospitalized Medicare patients, incur costs of caring for these patients, and remain below Medicare ceilings. Hospital discharge delays should be shortest in this case. But if the m arginal costs of these Medicare patients are above the average costs of caring for these patients, nursing homes should be less likely to adm it Medicare patients and lengths of stay should be longer. If nursing home costs are above the Medicare ceiling, nursing homes w ill clearly lose. Only if the marginal costs of these Medicare patients are below both average facility costs and the ceiling on which payment is based can nursing homes be expected to admit Medicare hospital beneficiaries.
The fifth variable measures the hospitals' control over nursing home beds. Many hospitals have their own SNFs. The expectation is that these hospitals w ill be more likely than others to discharge patients to their own unit, allowing them to shorten the length of the hospital stay and bill Medicare on a per diem basis for postacute care. Similar incentives exist for hospitals with swing-bed units (beds that can be used for either acute or postacute care) and to a lesser extent, for hospitals that have regular arrangements with SNFs to admit their patients for postacute care. Hospitals with any of these arrangements can be expected to have shorter discharge delays, other things equal, than other hospitals.
The final variable is designed to measure the impact of the PPS system itself on discharge delays. Four states during the study period had waivers which exempted them from Medicare PPS-New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland. All four had their own rate-setting systems. These systems varied considerably in design and structure but each had clearly weaker incentives to reduce lengths of stay than the PPS system. It is not possible to isolate the effect attributable to waiver status from the effect of initial differences between the waiver and PPS states. But any major difference can certainly be interpreted as an indication that the PPS incentives them selves have had some effect on discharge delays, irrespective of any effect of nursing home bed supply.
The final two studies examine possible reasons why nursing homes m ight be unw illing to adm it Medicare nursing home patients. Prior to the 1988 Catastrophic Coverage Act, the Medicare skilled nursing benefit was tightly restricted in both the types of patients covered and the types of nursing facilities that could provide covered care; as mentioned earlier, these restrictions are now somewhat more relaxed. At the time of this study, however, less than 2 percent of all nursing home care was funded by the SNF benefit (Feder and Scanlon 1982; W aldo, Levit, and Lazenby 1986) .
The first study (Bishop and Dubay 1988) uses Medicare-Medicaid automated certification system (MMACS) and MEDPAR data to iden tify whether or not a nursing home participates in Medicare, as well as the number of Medicare patients admitted. The key issue addressed in this study is how nursing home markets and reimbursement ar rangements affect nursing homes' willingness to participate in Med icare and to provide access for Medicare nursing home beneficiaries.
The second study (Dor 1988) uses Medicare nursing-home-cost report data for 1986 to estimate the marginal cost of Medicare patients. Medicare patients may be profitable for nursing homes once a facility has made a decision to serve heavy care patients in general and to devote a large share of its home to serving Medicare patients. In a facility oriented toward a lighter care mix of patients (Medicaid pa tients, for example), the marginal cost of Medicare patients is likely to be quite high and there may be little incentive for such facilities to respond to the increased demand for postacute patients created by PPS. The key issue here is to determine the relation between the additional nursing home cost of Medicare patients and the average cost of the nursing home, which is the basis of Medicare reimbursement.
Results
The major results of the component studies are summarized in this section, in question and answer form.
Do nursing home bed shortages affect hospital discharge delays?
The impacts of several variables on several proxy measures for ANDs are shown in table 4. The first variable is the supply of nursing home beds per 1,000 elderly persons. As noted earlier, there is more than a fourfold difference in bed supply nationally. Our results (Holahan 1988; Holahan and Dubay 1988; Kenney and Holahan 1988) con sistently show that the effect of the total bed supply on discharge delays is negative and statistically significant. The effect is consistent across data sets, alternative proxy measures of administratively nec essary days, and different subsets of the Medicare population. The results strongly suggest that the fewer beds per 1,000 elderly persons, the longer hospital lengths of stay, the higher the proportion of stays greater than the national mean, and the more outliers the hospital will experience. The implication is that hospitalized Medicare ben eficiaries are more easily discharged in markets with large numbers of nursing home beds. Nursing homes in markets with fewer beds can be more selective and appear to choose to serve other kinds of patients. The result is that patients end up staying longer in hospitals. The effect of bed supply is not large on average, however, with estimated elasticities ranging from 0.06 to 0.21 , depending on the measure. That is, a 10 percent increase in the number of beds per thousand elderly is associated with between a 0 .6 percent and a 2.1 percent reduction in discharge delays. The small impact is not sur prising given that relatively few Medicare discharges need postacute care.
Does the percentage o f nursing home beds certified to provide SNF care affect the ability o f hospitals to discharge patients?
There is clear evidence from several data sets (Hol ahan 1988; Holahan and Dubay 1988 ) that the lower the percentage of beds certified to provide SNF care, the longer the hospital stays. Hospitals certified to provide SNF care, in general, are more abun dantly staffed and provide a wider range of services. These nursing homes, in principle, should be better equipped to provide for the heavier care patients coming from short-stay hospitals. As a result, markets with nursing homes certified to provide SNF care should result in fewer patients remaining in hospitals. Our results confirm this expectation. The estimated impact of the percentage of beds certified to provide SNF care on measures of discharge delays did not vary substantially among studies (.06 to .09).
Do M edicaid nursing home reimbursement policies affect hospital discharge delays?
Access of Medicare hospital beneficiaries to nursing home beds can be expected to depend on the structure of the nursing home industry. given the supply of nursing home beds. Because of the importance of Medicaid as a third-party payer in this industry, the staffing and case mix of nursing homes can be expected to depend greatly on Medicaid policies. For example, if the Medicaid reimbursement system contains strong cost-containment incentives, nursing homes are likely to respond by reducing case mix and staffing commensurately (Dubay and Cohen 1988) . Thus, nursing homes in states with prospective payment systems, may be less well equipped to care for Medicare patients because of the strong cost-containment features of these sys tems. Our results (Holahan 1988; Holahan and Dubay 1988; Kenney and Holahan 1988) strongly support this expectation. Hospitals in areas with prospective payment systems have consistently greater dis charge delays than hospitals in states with retrospective systems, whichever measure and data set is used. Hospitals in states with flatrate reimbursement systems also have higher percentages of lengths of stay and outliers than hospitals under retrospective systems. Nursing homes in states with cost-based reimbursement systems appear to be more adequately staffed and more able to serve Medicare patients coming from hospitals.
Do Medicare nursing home reimbursement policies affect hospital discharge delays?
The evidence is ambiguous. Despite the fact that Medicare pays for only about 2 percent of all nursing home patients, its reimburse ment policies should also affect nursing homes' willingness to take Medicare beneficiaries from the hospital. This is because Medicare reimbursement policies are tied to the average cost of nursing homes, not to the cost of caring for Medicare patients. If industry costs tend to be low, the additional cost of a Medicare patient may exceed the average cost of the facility, even if it is below the Medicare ceiling, making nursing homes unw illing to take Medicare patients because they w ill increase average costs. If industry costs are high and the nursing home has average costs above the ceiling. Medicare patients w ill result in clear losses to the facility. Only if the marginal cost of Medicare patients is lower than both the average facility cost and the Medicare ceilings, w ill the facility have strong incentives to take on Medicare patients. But only nursing homes w ith relatively high costs are likely to have the staffing and service mix necessary to serve additional Medicare patients while avoiding financial losses.
These complex incentives are reflected in results (Holahan 1988; Holahan and Dubay 1988; Kenney and Holahan 1988) that are some what inconsistent across studies. In general however, we conclude that in areas where nursing home costs are on average greater than the Medicare ceiling, hospitals experience longer discharge delays and more outliers. W e also found some evidence that hospitals in markets where nursing home costs are well below the ceiling have difficulty in placing patients. This is consistent with the view that the marginal costs of Medicare patients in such homes is higher than average facility costs.
Has the PPS system itself reduced hospital discharge delays?
Four states during the study period had waivers that exempted them from Medicare PPS: New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland. A ll had rate-setting systems with somewhat weaker incentives to reduce lengths of stay than the PPS system, which allows us to get some insight into the effect of PPS per se. The evidence (Holahan and Dubay 1988; Kenney and Holahan 1988 ) is consistent that hospitals in the waiver states had substantially greater discharge delays on all three of our measures. The measures of delays were greater in New York and Massachusetts than in the other two states. The numerical results cannot be interpreted as solely measuring the magnitude of the effect because they included the effects of initial differences between the PPS and non-PPS states.
Do hospitals with their own SNF units or sw ing beds discharge patients more easily under the PPS system than hospitals with no nursing home arrangement?
Hospitals with their own SNF units or swing beds (i.e ., beds that can be used for either acute or postacute care) can be expected to discharge patients more promptly; they can then shorten the length of stay and bill Medicare on a per diem basis for postacute care. Hospitals with a regular arrangement with freestanding facilities should also have an easier time discharging patients than hospitals with no such arrangement. Our results demonstrate that hospitals with their own SNF units have fewer discharge delays on all AND measures (Holahan and Dubay 1988; Kenney and Holahan 1988 ) than other groups of hospitals. Hospitals with swing beds had fewer dis charge delays (Kenney and Holahan 1988 ) than all other groups of hospitals except those w ith SNF facilities.
Are patients in some DRGs more likely to be backed up in hospitals than others because o f difficulties in access to the nursing home market?
For the 16 DRGs most frequently associated with postacute care.
we found that stroke patients (DRG 14), patients with elective knee and hip replacement and hip and femur procedures (DRGs 209 and 210), and patients with organic disturbances and mental retardation (DRG 429) were more adversely affected by nursing home market conditions (Kenney and Holahan 1988) . These patients have sub stantially higher than average rehabilitation, nursing, and other needs, which appear to put them at a greater disadvantage in securing place ment in nursing homes when in markets with relatively few beds or tight reimbursement policies.
Are joint M edicare-M edicaid beneficiaries more disadvantaged than other Medicare beneficiaries?
The particular concern here is access for joint Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries compared with other Medicare hospital beneficiaries when bed supply is lim ited and Medicaid/Medicare reimbursement policies tight. The reason for this concern is that nursing homes have been shown to prefer private-pay patients, who are clearly more profitable (Scanlon 1980) . Joint Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries are compared with those for two other groups. Medicare patients with private in surance and those with Medicare only (Holahan 1988) . The results are shown in table 5. There were no major differences in the effects of bed supply and Medicaid reimbursement policies on hospital lengths of stay among the three groups. W e did find, however, that joint beneficiaries had a more difficult time being placed in nursing homes than the other two groups in states with fewer beds and tight reim bursement policies, in particular Medicaid policies. These policies have less of an effect on the Medicare-only and Medicare with private insurance groups, possibly because these groups have a substantially greater likelihood of becoming private-pay patients. W hile the joint beneficiaries had a more difficult time being placed in nursing homes in states with fewer beds or Medicaid prospective payment policies, they did not appear to have longer hospital stays; rather as the results show, they were more likely to be discharged home. This combination of sim ilar lengths of hospital stay but less access to nursing homes for the joint beneficiary groups at least suggests that they may be more likely to be discharged to home when they may require postacute nursing home care.
Do hospitals with lim ited access to the nursing home market have higher hospital costs per admission?
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Medicaid reimbursement policies affect hospital costs per admission, even when differences in other hospital characteristics were controlled for. These results (W elch and Dubay 1988) are based on analyses of PPS states only-waiver states were excluded. The results are shown in table 6. The elasticity on the beds per 1,000 elderly of -0.04 indicates that a hospital in a market with 10 percent more nursing home beds would have 0 .4 percent lower hospital costs per admission, all else being equal. The SNF percentage had a sim ilar effect. Medicaid prospective payment policies also were found to increase hospital costs o lo n g -te r m care a rra n g e m e n t fo r th e lo n g -te r m care v a ria b le s . R e g re ssio n a lso c o n tro ls fo r o th e r h o sp ita l n u rsin g hom e a rra n g e m e n ts , b ed s, case m ix , w a g e s, th e in te rn -re s id e n t ra tio , d isp ro p o rtio n a te share, area p o p u la tio n an d p e rc e n ta g e o f e ld e rly p o p u la tio n aged 7 5 and o v e r.
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Hospitals with their own SNFs also are able to reduce their costs per admission below that of other hospitals. Hospitals with their own SNFs appear to reduce costs only in tight nursing markets. That this advantage is reduced in areas with more favorable nursing home market conditions implies that hospitals have less difficulty discharging pa tients if nursing home market conditions are favorable even with no special arrangement.
These results provide further evidence that hospitals in unfavorable nursing home markets are at a relative disadvantage. W e then con- ducted simulations to determine whether these impacts were large or small. Essentially, we calculated the effect on hospital costs per case due just to the nursing home market and reimbursement policy vari ables. W e then arrayed the distribution-those at the top were most adversely affected, while those at the bottom were least affected. The hospitals in the distribution that have the worst AND problem are of greatest interest. Table 7 records the values at the 75th, 85th, and 95th percentile. For 25 percent of the hospitals, ANDs appear to increase costs by at least 1.9 percent over average market conditions; for 15 percent of the hospitals, they increase costs by at least 2.9 percent; and for 5 percent, they increase costs by at least 4.5 percent. A policy question of interest is how these effects compare to costs of teaching and having a patient population that is disproportionately poor. To consider this issue we constructed sim ilar distributions show ing the costs associated w ith teaching and disproportionate shares of the poor patients. Table 6 shows also parts of these distributions. Hospitals at the 75th percentile are not typically teaching hospitals, so their teaching costs are zero. A sim ilar situation occurs with dis proportionate share costs.
At the 85th percentile, predicted costs are greater for ANDs than for teaching or disproportionate shares of poor patients. At the 95th percentile, however, the impact of ANDs is about one-half that of teaching and below that of the disproportionate share of poor patients.
Thus, ANDs appear to affect a larger number of hospitals, but the most severe impact of ANDs (i.e ., the tail of the distribution) is less than for teaching and somewhat less than for disproportionate share.
What is the overall cost o f administratively necessary days?
In order to get some idea of the magnitude of the cost to United States hospitals of ANDs, we estimated the total cost to losers under the current system. This is equivalent to the total benefit to gainers, of course, because PPS rates were based initially on total hospital costs including the cost of discharge delays. Our results show that the PPS system significantly underpays hospitals with lim ited access to nursing home markets and overpays those with easy access.
Our estimation methodology uses regression analysis to link average hospital cost per case to a set of hospital-specific variables. Using the regression coefficients and the hospital's own values for the nursing home bed supply and market reimbursement policy characteristics, we obtained a set of predicted values for hospital's cost per case due, positively or negatively, to the effect of these characteristics. When compared to the mean for all hospitals, these predictions indicate whether a hospital is a net gainer or net loser from the system. The extent of this redistribution is given by m ultiplying the number of discharges at each "losing" hospital by the difference between its predicted value and the mean predicted value and summing these values for all "losing" hospitals. Note that this is probably a con servative estimate, because the impact of any systematic influence on discharge delays not included in the regression (such as Medicare coverage policy or any disadvantages that waiver hospitals face that are beyond their control) is not considered. The result is the total cost burden that the losers bear and that the winners have earned through PPS overpayments. In this manner, we estimate the cost to the losers (and, therefore, the gain to the winners) at $420 million in 1987 dollars. (This figure includes an estimate for New York and Massachusetts.) It should be emphasized again that this cost is not distributed evenly across "losing" hospitals, but rather is a substantial burden on a subgroup of hospitals.
Are Medicare SNF reimbursement rates high enough to encourage nursing home partic ipation in Medicare?
This issue has been central to policy debates in Medicare for several years. It is well recognized that Medicare patients have greater nursing and rehabilitation needs than other patients and are, therefore, more costly to nursing homes (Shaughnessy et al. 1985 ). Yet, nursing home payment policies are based on the average costs of all skilled nursing facilities with a ceiling set at 112 percent of the mean (adjusted for wage differences). Because the costs of Medicaid and private patients are below those of Medicare patients, Medicare rates may not be adequate. Medicare patients are far more costly than either private or Medicaid patients according to our estimated cost functions. The marginal cost of an average Medicare patient is estimated to be about $124 per day, compared to $67 for a private and $53 for a Medicaid patient (Dor 1988) . The m arginal cost of a Medicare patient declines as Medicare volume increases, whereas average facility cost and Med icare payment both increase as Medicare patients are substituted for lower-cost private and Medicaid patients. Thus, Medicare patients become profitable at a certain volume of Medicare patients. This volume is high, however, estimated at an average daily census of approximately 37 Medicare patients in a combined SNF/ICF and 43 in a SNF only. (The average number of beds in SNFs and SNF-ICFs is 88 and 127 respectively.) At these levels, however, the facility may find itself above the Medicare cost ceilings. It is not surprising, given these results, that few nursing homes participate in Medicare and that most of those that do lim it their participation to under 2,500 patient days per year.
That there is any nursing home participation at all is probably attributable to three factors. First, hospital-based facilities may par ticipate to facilitate moving patients out of the hospital, where the marginal revenue from additional days is zero; some marginal revenue is better than none when the patient cannot be sent home. Second, some Medicare patients eventually become private-pay patients which are profitable to the nursing home. Third, nursing homes may decide to participate in Medicare to a small degree, in order to maintain good relations w ith hospitals, physicians, and the community.
What factors determine Medicare admissions to skilled nursing facilities?
A central thesis of this article is that hospital back-up days are due in part to difficulty in obtaining access to nursing homes. Because the m arginal cost of Medicare patients is higher typically than the average facility cost, as already noted, the incentives to treat Medicare patients are m inim al at best. One study (Bishop and Dubay 1988) looked specifically at the issue of why nursing homes serve Medicare patients. The results provide several insights. First, facilities oriented to serving private-pay patients have higher Medicare admissions than other facilities. This is consistent with expectations, since such fa cilities tend to have higher average resources per patient day, making them better able to meet Medicare patient needs without increasing the average intensity of resources used per patient day.
Second, facilities were more likely to serve Medicare patients in areas where Medicaid patients are paid for under cost reimbursement and where Medicaid SNF rates are high. Nursing homes in states with either flat-rate or prospective-payment approaches were less likely to admit Medicare patients. It should be noted, however, that once a nursing home has made a decision to participate in Medicare, the proportion of Medicare admissions is lower the higher the Medicaid SNF rate. In other words, high Medicaid SNF rates allow nursing homes to have levels of resource use per patient that are high enough to serve Medicare patients. The higher the Medicaid SNF rate, how ever, the more attractive are Medicaid patients relative to Medicare patients. Medicare participation is also more likely and the proportion of Medicare patients admitted higher in for-profit facilities, hospitalbased SNFs, and larger nursing homes.
Conclusions and Policy Options
W e conclude that there is a problem of administratively necessary days, measured as discharge delays, for some hospitals under PPS. This finding is consistent across several measures of delay, several data sets, and several studies. Nursing home bed supply is one major factor, but there are others as well-including the stringency of Med icaid nursing home reimbursement policy, the adequacy of Medicare nursing home reimbursement rates relative to nursing home costs in an area, and the willingness of nursing homes in an area to serve patients needing skilled care.
Hospitals with more lim ited access to nursing homes have higher costs, other things being equal. The cost burden is not large on average, but substantial for some hospitals. Estimates indicate that the cost burden is sim ilar to that borne by hospitals with a dispro portionate share of poor patients, but less than that of teaching hospitals.
Joint Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries seem to have more limited access to the nursing home market than Medicare-only patients or patients with Medicare and private insurance. These patients do not stay in hospitals longer. Rather, they are more likely to be discharged home without postacute care. This finding suggests that hospitals are unwilling to keep these patients longer, perhaps because of the fi nancial hardship that continuing to care for them would impose. Hospitals with their own SNF facility or swing beds (beds that can be used for acute or postacute care) discharge patients more quickly than hospitals with no control over nursing home beds. These hospitals appear to be at a financial advantage under PPS, because discharging patients to SNF care in these circumstances leaves the hospital's PPS acute-care reimbursement rate unchanged while allowing the care of those patients to be reimbursed on a per diem basis.
Finally, four states that were not under PPS in 1985 (the study period) had far greater discharge delays than PPS hospitals-effects that were above and beyond the influences of the bed supply and reimbursement factors that we controlled for. This suggests that the states that in itially had waivers exempting them from the PPS sys tem-in particular New York and Massachusetts-have longer dis charge delays, for reasons that go beyond nursing home market access. Unlike PPS, the rate-setting systems in these states did not penalize long lengths of stay and, in fact, may have encouraged the pattern of providing care w ithin the hospital that in other states would be provided in nursing homes. This historical effect is very large and suggests that hospital discharge delays are more of a problem in these states than elsewhere. New York and Massachusetts hospitals are now under PPS. It w ill be extremely important to examine any changes in discharge delays that may have occurred since 1985, now that New York and Massachusetts have entered the PPS system.
Policy Options
Based on these findings we have considered a number of policy options. These are: m aintaining current policy, paying for administratively necessary days directly, increasing Medicare reimbursement rates for SNF care, adjusting PPS rates for nursing home access, and adjusting the current PPS outlier policy.
M aintain Status Quo. The first option is simply to do nothing; Medicare could sim ply continue to follow the policy of compensating hospitals for day outliers. Currently, the day outlier threshold is set at 1.94 standard deviations above the national geometric mean length of stay. Medicare pays the hospital on a per diem basis for the marginal costs of care thereafter.
The argument for doing nothing is that ANDs are not as serious a problem as some others that face the PPS system (e.g ., case-mix severity or being in a rural area) and that most hospitals, whatever their characteristics, have fared well in the early years of PPS. As a result, losses relative to what a hospital m ight have experienced may not be absolute losses. Moreover, our research has shown that the day-outlier policy does distribute Medicare dollars in the right di rection. The distribution is far from perfect, but hospitals in areas with fewer nursing home beds and with stringent Medicaid reim bursement policies tend to get more money. In addition, the hospitals with some control over postacute care beds (and thus the ability to discharge patients to postacute care more easily) receive fewer outlier dollars. The outlier days appear to be overcompensated-that is, dayoutlier payments are probably considerably higher (about $260 on average) than the marginal cost of AND patients (about $125, on average, based on estimates of the marginal cost of additional Medicare patients in nursing homes, by definition the same type of patients remaining in hospitals). But they do go some of the way to offsetting the lack of compensation for days below the outlier threshold.
A further argument in favor of doing nothing is that the presence of ANDs is largely the result of state policy toward the nursing home industry. Bed shortages and the orientation of nursing homes to lower levels of patient care, lower levels of staffing, etc., reflect decisions made in response to policy developed at the state level. It could be argued that the Medicare program should not have to compensate for decisions that have been made by states and could be remedied at the state level.
The argument against doing nothing is that the hospital itself is not responsible for the way the nursing home industry has developed in a given state. The fact remains that some hospitals have been hurt financially by the PPS system through no fault of their own. These hospitals must bear the costs of many ANDs that are not covered by the present-day outlier policy. Furthermore, as Medicare profit rates decline the problem w ill change from being an issue of relative loss to a true source of financial distress. And it is the Medicare beneficiary who w ill be hurt if quality of care suffers as a consequence.
Pay fo r AMDs Directly. The second option is to pay for ANDs as reported directly by hospitals, subject to review by HCFA, or by professional review organizations (PROs). Hospitals could presumably be given uniform reporting instruments with which to record ANDs. Such instruments would identify the days that are delayed beyond the time at which the physician authorizes discharge and provide the reason for delay. Delays related to the unavailability of a nursing home bed and unrelated to practice patterns would be reimbursed on a separate per diem basis by Medicare. This approach has the potential of being more accurate than policies that would link payment to bed availability or one which compensates for all day outliers (discussed below).
This policy, however, has numerous disadvantages. It would add enormously to the paperwork and reporting requirements of hospitals, and would place a tremendous burden on HCFA (or the PROs) to assess the veracity of the AND data being reported by the hospital. Rejecting claims may be very difficult if documentation is provided by the hospital. If the likelihood of rejection is low and AND payment rates exceed the m arginal cost of these days, the number of claims could rise dramatically. Outcomes would also be subject to consid erable variation sim ply related to efforts that discharge planners are w illing to make to locate available beds. Furthermore, the paperwork burden would have to be repeated each year as hospitals continued to report the number of ANDs. The final disadvantage is that paying directly for ANDs would return to the hospital control of the amount of payment it receives; this would be in direct contradiction to the philosophy underlying the whole PPS system.
Increase the M edicare Reimbursement Rate fo r SNF Care. A third option would be to increase Medicare reimbursement rates for SNF care to encourage greater access for Medicare hospital patients. This general policy option could also include liberalization of SNF coverage re quirements. The intent is to increase access in markets where it is now lim ited. This may be a desirable policy for many reasons, but could become a very expensive way to address the AND problem. It would mean increased payment rates for the SNF care that is currently provided, as well as for the care such a policy would induce because of expanded access for Medicare beneficiaries to SNFs. The increased use would come not only from those patient days classified currently as ANDs but also from some patients who currently go home as well as some who use SNFs, as Medicaid or private-pay patients. This may improve the efficiency of the entire system, but it would be a relatively high-cost policy for Medicare.
This policy is also not as simple as it may appear. In fact. Medicare access to SNF care depends on the existing structure (e.g ., staff and case mix) of the nursing home industry. As we have shown, Medicare rates under current policy do not come close to covering the marginal cost of additional Medicare patients in most homes. Medicare payment rates exceed the marginal costs of adding Medicare patients only in homes that are well staffed and already serve a large volume of patients. Thus, the increases that w ill be required to assure access are likely to be quite large.
Adjust PPS Rates fo r Nursing Home Access. A fourth option is to make adjustments to the PPS payment rates that reflect nursing home access sim ilar to the current adjustments for indirect medical edu cation. Under this proposal, HCFA could add or subtract an adjust ment factor to the standardized amount for the effect of nursing home access on hospital cost per admission. Hospitals that have more limited access to the nursing home market, and, therefore, have higher costs per admission, would receive higher PPS payments. Those that are easily able to discharge patients (and, therefore, have lower cost per admission for these DRGs) would get lower PPS payments.
Such an adjustment could be made for all DRGs or just those that most commonly lead to postacute care. Adjusting the standardized amount for all DRGs would be more straightforward conceptually but may be unnecessary and undesirable, given that access to nursing home beds probably does not aflfect the length of stay for most DRGs. Since it is likely to affect cost per admission for some DRGs (those most commonly leading to postacute care), making some adjustment may be warranted.
The first problem with this option is that it introduces yet another adjustment to the PPS payment system, which already includes special treatment of teaching hospitals, hospitals with a disproportionate share of low-income recipients, rural status, and other factors. Second, adjusting for different levels of nursing home care supply is not
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'i SI 0 sp (id sufficient to create equity. Our research finds that other characteristics of the nursing home market (e .g ., the percentage of facilities providing skilled care, Medicaid reimbursement policies, and perhaps others not controlled for) also affect access of Medicare hospital patients. A policy that incorporates these other factors is very difficult to design, but a policy that does not incorporate them would not solve the equity problem.
Adjust the Current Outlier Policy. The fifth and final option is to make adjustments to current Medicare outlier policy. For the 16 DRGs that most commonly lead to postacute care, the outlier threshold ranges from 22 to 30 days w ith episodes that have mean lengths of stay of 8 to 12 days. After the stay crosses the outlier threshold. Medicare w ill pay at 60 percent of the Medicare per diem, approx imately $260 in 1987.
One option would be to liberalize the day-outlier cutoff, say to 1.6 standard deviations, but reduce the outlier payment. Under such a scheme a greater proportion of long-stay patients could be reimbursed by the system with no increase in cost. One could reduce the dayoutlier payment from its current 60 percent of the hospital per diem to, say, 30 to 40 percent (which would still be above the current hospital-based nursing home ceiling), or simply pay at the hospitalbased SNF ceiling for the area. W hile an adjusted outlier policy would not pay all the costs for ANDs for those hospitals where it is a problem, the statistical relations among bed supply, Medicaid reim bursement policies, etc., and outliers is such that the payments would tend to be distributed appropriately.
The problem with this proposal is that it would result in payment for some outliers unrelated to ANDs and in payments for outliers in all geographic areas-even those without lim ited access to nursing home beds-and for outliers in DRGs where postacute care is un common. This is not a trivial problem. New York and Massachusetts have a larger number of long-stay patients and more outliers than any other states. Even the number of days on outlier status in those states is longer than elsewhere. Some of these days are accounted for by nursing home market conditions, but many are not. Using outlier policy in this manner would overcompensate hospitals in these states, where the problem seems to lie in historical responses to those states' rate-setting systems and to institutional differences in the role of the hospital. This policy would also go counter to current policy directions which are to deemphasize the day-outlier policy. Finally, it may weaken PPS incentives to reduce lengths of stay.
Our Preferred Strategy
W e think the most promising approaches are the third and the fifth options: increasing nursing home reimbursement rates and adjusting current outlier policy. The latter would involve a reduction in the per diem rate for days exceeding the day-outlier threshold to a level consistent with the ceilings faced by hospital-based nursing homes. Then, the day-outlier threshold would be liberalized so that a greater proportion of days provided to long-stay patients were covered. As indicated in our discussion above, this policy would be imperfect but, in general, additional Medicare payments would go to the right hos pitals. This change in itself could be budget neutral.
According to evidence in this study, the marginal cost of Medicare patients exceeds the current reimbursement rates for most nursing homes. Increasing nursing home rates would be equitable and en courage greater access for patients being discharged from hospitals. The major disadvantage of increasing nursing home reimbursement rates, perhaps combined with a movement to case-mix-adjusted pay ments, is the budgetary cost. It is policy makers who must ultimately decide whether the increased access for Medicare patients is worth the budgetary cost. Our analyses, however, provide evidence that the AND problem is sufficiently large to merit serious consideration of this option. As recognized above, the relaxation of coverage require ments in April 1988 and the Catastrophic Coverage Act are likely to change the access of Medicare patients to nursing homes, affecting both the size of the problem and the budgetar}^ impact of increasing rates. Therefore, policy makers may wish to wait until these changes have been implemented before making a final decision on increasing nursing home rates.
